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Abstract. This Article discusses the bifurcated notions on the purpose of
working as an attorney—whether the purpose is to attain wealth or whether
the work in and of itself is the purpose. This Article explores the sentiments
held by distinguished and influential nineteenth-century lawyers—particularly
David Hoffman and George Sharswood—regarding the legal ethics regarding
attorney’s fees and how money in general is the root of many ethical dilemmas
within the arena of legal practice. Through the texts of Hoffman and
Sharswood, we find the origins of the ethical rules all American attorneys are
subject to in their various jurisdictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The American Bar (also referred to herein as “the Bar”) has always been
somewhat bifurcated on whether lawyers are members of a profession in
which money is the reward for good work, or a business in which the
pursuit of money is the purpose of the work itself. In the first half of the
nineteenth century, lawyers were brought up on William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England.1 In it, Blackstone made the point that
lawyers were gentlemen and professionals, and too avid a pursuit of wealth
in the practice of law was neither gentlemanly nor professional.2 Indeed,
Blackstone took this so far as to comment that a lawyer could not sue a
client for an unpaid fee. 3 In this regard, lawyers were unique among
working people. The language of the law, too, reinforced the idea that
lawyers were gentlemen for whom a fee was not the principle motivation
for their work.4 Members of the elite bar referred to legal practitioners
who chased after fees and the accumulation of wealth as “pettifoggers”
and “tavern lawyers,” terms of derogation and contempt.5
Indeed, I suggest today that there has been a significant philosophical
divide amongst American lawyers for more than two centuries. That
divide is based upon the perception of whether the law is a “business”
where the profit motive is central to our activities as lawyers,6 or whether
the law is a “profession” in which monetary rewards are certainly
important, but the primary motivation for law practice is something other
than money, for instance, public service or maintenance of the legal

1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765).
2. See id. at 300 (illustrating the pursuit of fees goes against the behavior by which a lawyer
should conduct themselves).
3. Id.
4. See generally id. at 300 (positing that lawyers should not pursue fees because the principal
purpose of their work is not to make money).
5. See MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776–1876,
43–4 (1976) (characterizing lawyers who went after clients for unpaid fees as greedy); cf. Gerard W.
Gawalt, Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts, 1740–1840, AM. J. LEGAL HIST., Oct. 1970, at 283,
283–84 (explaining how society viewed lawyers as problems due to the usage of their background,
influence, and intelligence as ways to propel them into prominent political and judicial positions).
For visual representations of pettifoggers, also known as subpar legal practitioners, see generally M.H.
Hoeflich, Lawyers, Fees, & Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Popular Art, 1800–1925, GREEN BAG, Winter 2001,
at 147, 150–55 (showing images that depict the societal view of lawyers during that time period). See
generally M.H. HOEFLICH, THE LAW IN POSTCARDS & EPHEMERA, 1890–1962 (2012) (providing
postcards which depict typical lawyer sentiments at the time).
6. See, e.g., Champ Andrews, The Law—A Business or a Profession?, 17 YALE L.J. 602, 605 (1908)
(describing the general dispute regarding whether the law is seen more as a profession or as a
business).
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system, or simply the pursuit of an old and honorable profession.7
I suggest for most of the nineteenth century, the elite members of the
Bar in the United States argued that the acquisition of wealth was not a
principal purpose of the law practice and that these very same elite lawyers
held lawyers for whom the pursuit of wealth was a principal purpose in
low regard.8 Indeed, I propose the development of ethical rules for the
Bar in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries stemmed, in large
part, from a desire to set the law practice at a distance from other trades
and professions by limiting the business aspects of practice.9 I also posit a
prime motivation for the adoption of these codes was to combat the
popular perception, expressed in literature and popular art, that all lawyers
were, in fact, money-grubbing pettifoggers who would do anything for a
fee, even that which was immoral or illegal.10 At the same time, I also
postulate that the legal profession’s arguments against greed derive, or at
least, parallel, similar arguments made by those who were writing about
and engaged in mercantile pursuits in nineteenth-century America.
Indeed, one of the great ironies of the legal profession’s attempts to
distance itself from charges that lawyers were simply wealth-seeking
businessmen is that businessmen and writers on business were also
attempting to dispel popular perceptions that the only purpose of business
was to accumulate wealth no matter what the social consequences. In
effect, I suggest that legal ethics and business ethics were developing in
quite similar ways in the United States in the nineteenth century.
II. LEGAL ETHICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
There were no official codes or rules of legal ethics during virtually all of
the nineteenth century. This does not mean, however, that lawyers were
not concerned with the subject. In fact, legal ethics was of great concern
to many members of the American Bar in the United States during this
period.11 One finds virtually all of the concepts and rules central to legal
7. Id.
8. See Michael Ariens, Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of American Legal Ethics,
67 ARK. L. REV. 571, 584 (2014) (discussing the sentiments of some notable lawyers regarding legal
ethics in the nineteenth century).
9. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY 774 (Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846) (reviewing the
historical background of the ethical rules).
10. See id. at 611 (rejecting and refusing to promote a model of advocacy where the lawyer was
essentially a “hired gun,” but recognizing there were some lawyers that were willing to do just about
anything for their clients).
11. 2 HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 752–77 (reprinting the 1836 edition); see M.H. Hoeflich, Legal
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ethics in the twenty-first century in the legal literature of the nineteenth
century. Preeminent among these nineteenth century American writings
are two: David Hoffman’s Fifty Resolutions on Professional Deportment,12 first
published in 1836 as part of his A Course of Legal Study, 13 and Judge
George Sharswood’s An Essay on Professional Ethics, 14 first published in
1854. It is not insignificant that the authors of these works were both
experienced lawyers as well as law professors. Hoffman was a professor at
the short-lived law school affiliated with the University of Maryland in
Baltimore 15 and Sharswood was a professor at the law school at the
University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. 16 Both men were also
members of the legal elite—successful lawyers and law professors in major
eastern urban centers. 17 Both wrote their works for the purpose of
educating future lawyers and both supported the highest aspirations of the
Bar at the time.18
David Hoffman was born in Baltimore, Maryland in 1784. 19 He
attended St. John’s College in Annapolis and then studied law in Baltimore
and London before establishing himself as a lawyer in Baltimore.20 He
was appointed as a professor of law at the University of Maryland and, in
the next few years, published a series of lectures as well as the first
Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The “Other Tradition”, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793, 793–99
(1999) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Other Tradition] (providing statements regarding legal ethics from various
attorneys, including Hoffman). Though lawyers concerned themselves with legal ethics, one should
not take it for granted that Hoffman’s thoughts were “representative either of practice at the time or
the consensus of republican legal elites on the[ir] specific legal duties . . . .” Norman W. Spaulding,
The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1397, 1415–16 (2003).
12. 2 HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 752–75.
13. Id.
14. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (T. & J. W. Johnson & Co.
1854).
15. Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L.
REV. 673, 678 (1979) [hereinafter Bloomfield, David Hoffman] (giving biographical information on
Hoffman’s professional life).
16. George W. Wickersham, Judge Sharswood, 62 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 615–16 (1914) (announcing
the professional career of Judge Sharswood).
17. See Bloomfield, David Hoffman, supra note 15, at 674, 678 (explaining Hoffman was born
“into a prosperous mercantile family” and after sitting for the bar “built up an enviable practice in
the state and federal courts, while enhancing his social status through his marriage.”); see also
Wickersham, supra note 16, at 615 (“During eighteen years . . . in addition to the arduous labors of a
judge of a court of first instance, he discharged the duties of a professor of law in the University of
Pennsylvania.”).
18. See e.g., Bloomfield, David Hoffman, supra note 15, at 674, 686 (emphasizing the large impact
Hoffman had on the practice of law); Wickersham, supra note 16, at 615 (outlining the contributions
Judge Sharswood has made to the legal field).
19. Bloomfield, David Hoffman, supra note 15, at 674.
20. Id. at 674–75.
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substantial American work on legal education, A Course of Legal Study, in
1817.21 This volume was immediately hailed as a major work and was
reprinted in an expanded form in 1836. 22 As part of the expanded
edition, Hoffman included the first American rules of legal ethics, what he
called his Rules of Professional Deportment, which he termed an “auxiliary
subject.” 23 Hoffman included fifty rules in this work, many of them
virtually the same as the particular state sanctioned rules of professional
conduct to which American lawyers are subject today. 24 One rule,
however, the forty-ninth, is quite different and begins by saying, “Avarice
is one of the most dangerous and disgusting of vices.”25
Hoffman’s forty-ninth rule continues:
Fortunately its presence is oftener found in age, than in youth; for if it be
seen as an early feature in our character, it is sure, in the course of a long life,
to work a great mass of oppression, and to end in both intellectual and
moral desolation. Avarice gradually originates every species of indirection.
Its offspring is meanness; and it contaminates every pure and honourable
principle. It can consist with honesty scarce for a moment, without gaining
the victory. Should the young practitioner, therefore, on the receipt of the
first fruits of his exertions, perceive the slightest manifestation of this vice,
let him view it as his most insidious and deadly enemy. Unless he can then
heartily, and thoroughly eradicate it, he will find himself, perhaps slowly, but
surely, capable of unprofessional—mean—and finally, dishonest acts;—
which, as they cannot be long concealed, will render him conscious of the
loss of character; make him callous to all the nicer feelings; and ultimately so
degrade him, that he consents to live upon arts, from which his talents,
acquirements, and original integrity would certainly have rescued him, had
he at the very commencement fortified himself with the resolution to reject
all gains, save those acquired by the most strictly honourable and
21. Id. at 678.
22. 2 HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 752–77; see Bloomfield, David Hoffman, supra note 15, at 678
(“This volume, which won for its author international acclaim, provided the student with a systematic
bibliographical guide to every branch of law.”).
23. 2 HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 752–77. The only time Hoffman refers to professional
deportment in the book’s first edition is in a section deemed “Auxiliary Subjects.” Ariens, supra
note 8, at 584 (citing DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED
TO THE STUDENTS OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 324 (Baltimore, Coale & Maxwell 1817)).
24. See generally 2 HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 752–77 (illustrating the similarities between many
of the rules of professional deportment created by Hoffman and the rules of professional conduct
already followed by lawyers at the time); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2013).
25. 2 HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 774.
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professional means. I am therefore, firmly resolved, never to receive from
any one, a compensation, not justly and honourably my due; and if fairly
received, to place on it no undue value; to entertain no affection for money,
further than as a means of obtaining the goods of life—the art of using money
being quite as important for the avoidance of avarice, and the preservation
of a pure character, as that of acquiring it.26

I think it is not an exaggeration to say that based on the language of this
rule, Hoffman viewed greed as the worst possible characteristic of a lawyer
and believed that a greedy lawyer would “find himself, perhaps slowly, but
surely, capable of unprofessional—mean—and, finally, dishonest acts.”27
A lawyer’s compensation, according to Hoffman, must be honorably
received. 28 Anything else is unprofessional and a sign of a degraded
character.29
Judge George Sharswood was much indebted to Hoffman in his An
Essay on Professional Ethics, although he did not agree with Hoffman on
every point. 30 Judge Sharswood also did not make quite as broad
pronouncements on avarice as Hoffman, but he did make it quite clear
that greed was not an acceptable characteristic of a lawyer. In the section
of his essay on professional compensation, Judge Sharswood focused on
two questions: (1) whether a lawyer should sue his client for a fee;31 and
(2) whether a lawyer should take a contingent fee.32 On the first question
Judge Sharswood generally decided it is better that a lawyer lose his fee
than sue his client.33 On the second question, Judge Sharswood firmly
denounced the notion that a lawyer might base his fee on success in a case
as akin to the common law wrongs of barratry and champerty. 34 But
Judge Sharswood’s reasons for these opinions strongly echo Hoffman’s
comments on avarice. He says:

26. Id. at 774–75.
27. Id. at 774.
28. Id. at 774–75.
29. Id.
30. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 9 (identifying the general subjects of the essay as (1)
“[t]hose duties which the lawyer owes to the public or commonwealth” and (2) “[t]hose which are
due from him to the court, his professional brethren, and his client”).
31. See id. at 153–54 (recognizing an attorney should be compensated for the work the attorney
does if the client is able to pay, “[b]ut it must be an extraordinary—a very particular case—that will
justify an attorney resorting to legal proceedings, to enforce the payment of fees”).
32. See id. at 155–56 (arguing contingent fee agreements “are a very dangerous tendency” for an
attorney to get into, and therefore “to be declined in all ordinary cases”).
33. Id. at 154.
34. Id. at 156–57.
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The question really is, what is best for the people at large[]—what will be
most likely to secure them a high-minded, honorable Bar? It is all-important
that the profession should have and deserve that character. A horde of
pettifogging, custom-seeking, money-making lawyers, is one of the greatest
curses with which any state or community can be visited.35

In a similar vein, Judge Sharswood quotes Edward Gibbon’s description
in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire36 of the changes in the Roman
legal profession over time from a group of learned men to that of
tradesmen:
The noble art, which had once been preserved as the sacred inheritance of
the patricians, was fallen into the hands of freedmen and patricians, who,
with cunning rather than with skill, exercised a sordid and pernicious
trade.37

Sharswood’s comment upon this passage is revealing:
Is not this probably the history of the decline of the profession in all
countries from an honorable office to a money-making trade?38

Underlying these passages from both Hoffman and Sharswood is a very
specific notion of the legal profession and what is required of a lawyer.
The legal profession is not a trade to be entered upon for the sake of
acquiring wealth. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with becoming wealthy
as a lawyer, but the acquisition of wealth should not be the lawyer’s
primary goal. If a lawyer does seek wealth above honor, then the lawyer
will be led, according to both Hoffman and Sharswood, to act in
dishonorable ways much to the discredit of the lawyer personally and of
the profession as a whole.39
In the social and professional context in which both Sharswood and
Hoffman were living, a lawyer who was avaricious would run the danger of
taking unjust cases which both believed, to varying degrees, to be
unethical.40 These men adhered to the nineteenth century tradition that
35. Id. at 150.
36. 2 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
(1776).
37. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 144 (quoting 2 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 204 (1776)).
38. Id. at 145.
39. Ariens, supra note 8, at 585–86.
40. Id. at 611.
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lawyers should not take on all civil cases regardless of their merits and
regardless of the justness of the cause (criminal cases were viewed
differently). Instead, both Hoffman and Sharswood believed that lawyers
should exercise their skills and talents selectively and screen clients whom
he took on.41 A lawyer who was out only for the money to be earned
would inevitably take on cases that lacked merit or that were unjust—a
result that both Hoffman and Sharswood deemed to be highly unethical.42
Essentially, a lawyer acted ethically if, in the course of his practice, he
acquired wealth as a consequence of being a good lawyer, while a lawyer
who practiced law to acquire health did not.
In the decades following the publication of Hoffman’s and Sharswood’s
texts, their ideas became enshrined in the conventional wisdom of the
American Bar. 43 Among the post-Civil War works written about legal
ethics by members of the Bar, several stand out, but one of the most
important was William Allen Butler’s Lawyer and Client: Their Relation, Rights
& Duties44 published by Appleton & Company at New York in 1871.45
Butler was a leader of the New York and American Bars, and was the son
of the prominent New York lawyer, B.F. Butler, and during his career he
served as president both of the American Bar Association and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.46 He was the senior
partner of a leading New York law firm, Butler, Stillman & Hubbard, and
was also a well known poet and essayist.47 Thus, one may justly suggest
that his Lawyer and Client represented the ideas of the highest level of the
American Bar.
Not surprisingly, Butler’s discussion of lawyers’ fees and the acquisition
41. “Hoffman thought that the lawyer should ‘ever claim the privilege of solely judging’
whether and how far to pursue his clients’ cases and that he should not pursue cases if he concluded
that the client ought to lose.” Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 209, 214 n.6 (2003) (citing 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY:
ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 752–775 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal
1836)). “Sharswood may have held similar views, for example that a lawyer ‘should throw up his
brief sooner than do what revolts against his own sense of honor and propriety.’” Id. (citing 3
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 74–75 (T. & J.W. Johnson 1874)).
42. See id. at 214 n.6 (discussing how Hoffman and Sharswood viewed lawyers who were
primarily out for money).
43. Much of what the American Bar has adopted for its model rules of professional conduct
came from thoughts on attorney ethics by Hoffman and Sharswood. See generally MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
44. WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER, LAWYER AND CLIENT: THEIR RELATION, RIGHTS & DUTIES
(Appleton & Co. 1871).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER, A RETROSPECT OF FORTY YEARS, 1825–1865 211–13 (1911).
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of wealth come at the very end of his text as befitting a subject far less
important than the lawyer’s responsibilities to his client. His discussion
begins with a consideration of whether a lawyer should sue a client for his
fee, much like Sharswood. In this context, he opines:
But while I believe that our courts are right in holding that the services of
counsel may be a matter of contract equally with all other kinds of service,
and that the legal laborer is worthy of his hire, it should not be forgotten
for a moment that the true motive and spur of effort on the part of the lawyer is something
far beyond the pecuniary result of his efforts.48

And:
It is not for the fee of his client, not even for the professional repute which
follows success, and which is dearer than money, that a lawyer truly gives his
days and nights to his client’s cause. It is to satisfy his own sense of duty,
and for this he will go far beyond the service which would be doled out for a
stipulated price.49

Butler’s sentiments, like those of Sharswood and Hoffman, are noble
and honorable in almost a Roman fashion—the lawyer is above
commerce.50 He discharges the duties of his profession in pursuit of a far
higher ideal than money.51 But today we must recognize that these were
what we would term aspirational statements and the reality of law practice
for the vast majority of lawyers—lawyers who did not have independent
wealth and come from families in the upper echelons of American society,
what we would today characterize as “the one percent”—was quite
different. These lawyers, whom men like Butler called pettifoggers, were
lawyers who did not attend expensive law schools, who did not join family
law firms, and could not depend upon established social and familial
networks for clients. 52 One can imagine, the vast majority of lawyers
during the period depended upon their practices for their daily bread and
often succumbed to the temptations Hoffman, Sharswood, and Butler
warned against because they simply had no choice. And among this vast
majority of lawyers who were honest and simply trying to make a living
there were also a few—perhaps more than a few—who made the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

BUTLER, supra note 44, at 3–4 (emphasis added).
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 73–74.
Id.
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acquisition of wealth the central purpose of their lives and practice. It was
these lawyers who did fall into dishonesty and unethical practice and who
gave the legal profession a bad public image.
In 1896, Samuel A. Wandell, a young, established New York lawyer
published a popular book for the Bar as a guide to practice.53 It was more
than simply a guide to legal ethics. Instead, it was what we might today
call a general introduction to the practice of law for lawyers who did not
come from elite social or educational backgrounds. 54 By the 1890s,
several waves of immigrants to the United States were bringing about
substantial social and political change.55 One can imagine, many of the
sons and daughters of these immigrants desired to become lawyers, much
to the worry of the elite Bar who feared that the immigrants would not
embrace the elite’s ideals of practice. Wandell’s book was very clearly
intended for these new applicants to the profession.56 The advice that the
book contains reflects this. One finds nuggets such as “you should not be
careless or negligent about your personal appearance”57 and “you should
not suffer your office to become disorderly.”58 Wandell’s advice about
money and practice is equally simple and forthright and in the tradition of
his elite predecessors:
You should not practice law with the idea that your profession is only
designed as a means of money getting; you should not devote your whole
life to the abject service of Mammon. There are lawyers who, it seems, erect
a golden calf in the office as soon as they are admitted to the bar, and who
spend their best energies and talents in its worship. Yours is a calling of
dignity and honor, and you should honor your vocation. You might as well
hang out the three balls which denote the calling of the pawn-broker, as to
develop into a scheming, flinty-hearted lawyer, whose sole desire is personal

53. SAMUEL H. WANDELL, “YOU SHOULD NOT”: A BOOK FOR LAWYERS, OLD AND YOUNG,
CONTAINING THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL ETHICS (Michael H. Hoeflich ed., Law Exchange 2014)
(1896).
54. Id. at 1.
55. See Faye Hipsman & Doris Meissner, Immigration in the United States: New Economic, Social,
Political Landscapes with Legislative Reform on the Horizon, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 16,
2013),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-united-states-new-economic-socialpolitical-landscapes-legislative-reform (profiling the U.S. foreign-born population and elucidating the
peak of the foreign-born percentage of the U.S. population was fifteen percent between 1890 and
1910).
56. WANDELL, supra note 53, at 1.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 7.
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aggrandizement and wealth.59

III. BUSINESS ETHICS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States was
primarily a rural nation and its economy was based, to a large extent, on
agricultural pursuits. 60 By the end of the nineteenth century, the
population shift from the countryside to urban centers was well underway
and the American economy was rapidly becoming the largest in the world
due to America’s rapid industrialization. 61 Part and parcel of these
changes was a shift in the way Americans defined success.62 In the early
part of the century, the majority of Americans lived in the country and
small villages and considered themselves successful if they owned small
farms or were small town merchants.63 By the 1830s, the American ideal
of success seemed to be changing radically as tens of thousands of young
men were abandoning rural and small town America for the big cities
carrying with them dreams of becoming wealthy merchants, industrialists,
and entrepreneurs.64 Success became a mainstay of American aspirations
and wealth—wealth that need not be inherited but that could be acquired
by every individual through diligence and hard work, became the
paradigmatic characteristic of success.65 America was becoming a land of
unlimited aspirations and unbridled ambition.66
Although businessmen did not have professional organizations or links
to an organized state entity like the courts, there were a large number of
writers who published books and articles intended to guide young clerks
and others involved in mercantile pursuits. 67 These guides provided
advice on everything from how a young businessperson should dress, to
the types of entertainment in which they should indulge, to how they
should comport themselves in both their professional and private lives.68
59. Id. at 3.
60. See generally GABRIEL ABEND, THE MORAL BACKGROUND: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
HISTORY OF BUSINESS ETHICS 10–12 (2014).
61. See id. at 10–12 (discussing the effects in urban areas due to the Industrial Revolution).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see, M.H. Hoeflich, The Christian Origins of American Legal Ethics, 86 KAN. BAR J. 49, 5051 (2017), (developing a corresponding theme in a related context).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 9–10 (describing the period around the 1850s as “the transformation of America”).
67. See id. at 122–23 (discussing literature advising “young men entering mercantile life”).
68. See THOMAS AUGST, THE CLERK’S TALE: YOUNG MEN AND MORAL LIFE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4 (2003) (discussing conduct books from the nineteenth century
used for businessmen development).
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These guides sought to produce a class of young clerks and business
entrepreneurs who would not only achieve financial success, but also in so
doing, raise the public perception of business as a worthwhile
occupation. 69 Underlying these guides were the aspirations of senior,
successful members of the business community to achieve high social
status as well as to present themselves as representing the highest levels of
civic and Christian ethics. 70 Throughout the nineteenth century, there
appeared a torrent of how-to books, articles, and even novels that extolled
the virtues of the successful businessperson and provided guidance to
young aspirants on achieving business success.71
It is not at all surprising that the ideals for behavior, both professional
and private, espoused by this aspirational business literature were very
much the same—taking into account the different demands on lawyers
and merchants—for lawyers and those occupied in business pursuits. 72
And, again, just as the guides for young lawyers condemned greed as a
professional motivation,73 so did the guides for young clerks and those
engaged in business.74 Wealth was good; greed was evil.
Throughout the business literature of the nineteenth century, there is a
strong theme: the acquisition of wealth is a positive activity. 75
Businesspeople who succeed can be virtuous in their dealings.76 It is not
necessary to descend into trickery, fraud, or dishonest dealing to become
wealthy. 77 Indeed, greed makes people forget their ethical duties to
69. See id. at 4 (discussing guide books focused on perception, including the importance of
character traits such as “citizenship . . . honor, reputation, morals, manners, [and] integrity”).
70. See, e.g., ABEND, supra note 60, at 124 (“[B]ecause Christian business ethics approaches
focus on motives . . . they can turn out to have a surprisingly good implication—surprisingly good if
you are an employer or principal, anyway.”).
71. See, e.g., id. at 123 (describing literature promoting true honesty as a virtue in business).
Abend lists categories of “morally acceptable motives” including principle, love of God, love of
virtue, and love of right. Id. at 124. Abend also lists several characteristics as “morally unacceptable”
including “policy, expediency, self-interest, self-love, pride, vanity, and love of praise.” Id.
72. See id. at 231 (discussing nineteenth century literature asserting it would be a happy day
when business schools test students the way law schools test students).
73. See id. at 24 (describing lawyers as those who care about society, and “not only about
making fat profits”).
74. See id. at 253 (“Prominent businessmen were accused of greed and selfishness.”).
75. See e.g., id. (discussing literature which “addresses not only the proper use of a person’s
money and material possessions, but also their proper acquisition, as well the proper use of her
talents, time, and soul . . . [this] is a common tool in the toolkit of the Christian business ethicist”).
76. See Markovits, supra note 41, at 223 (“[R]ecall[ing] the venerable Aristotelian tradition that
constructed an entire ethical theory around the idea that virtue promotes the general well-being or
flourishing . . . of the virtuous.”).
77. Cf. id. (“[A] person’s ethics and her first-personal success are intertwined . . . so that a
person does well by doing good . . . .”).
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society.78 Greed causes businesspeople to cheat their customers, to make
false claims, and to descend into the worst morasses of lost virtue.79 Just
about any nineteenth century businessperson who read books about
business, business periodicals like Freeman Hunt’s Merchants Magazine, 80
any of the hundreds of biographies of successful businessmen, or novels
about young men who began as clerks with no property who through hard
work and virtuous behavior became titans of business, would have quickly
imbibed the doctrine that wealth acquired honestly and for the proper
purposes was a positive good, while wealth acquired solely for the purpose
of becoming rich (i.e. as a result of greed) was a social evil. 81 The
Christian religion also fostered virtuous business practices and the
acquisition of wealth for good purposes and not simply from greed, as was
the doctrine stated in such books as Henry Augustus Boardman’s The Bible
in the Counting House.82
Thus, the young lawyer and the young merchant clerk were both
exposed to the same moral imperatives: be successful, achieve this success
honestly through hard work and moral behavior, and eschew naked greed
and the love of money for its own self. 83 In spite of these shared
aspirations, by the end of the nineteenth century—what has been called
the “Gilded Age”84— had arrived and the growth of large industries such
as steel, oil, and, above all, railroads, had created a new type of
businessman, the new “robber barons,” men who sought to increase their
personal fortunes and worldly power to levels not before known in the
78. See e.g., Brandon Keim, Greed Isn’t Good: Wealth Could Make People Unethical, WIRED (Feb. 27,
2012, 4:12 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/income-and-ethics/ (discussing a study which
concluded unethical behavior is driven in part by greed).
79. Cf. id. (“[Greed] insulates people from the consequences of their actions, reduces their need
for social connections and fuels feelings of entitlement, all of which become self-reinforcing cultural
norms.”).
80. Freeman Hunt, The Merchant’s Magazine and Commercial Review (1912)
81. See e.g., id. at 138 (“The good merchant is not in haste to be rich . . . [h]e recollects that he is
not merely a merchant, but a man; and that he has a mind to improve, a heart to cultivate and a
character to form.”).
82. HENRY A. BOARDMAN, THE BIBLE IN THE COUNTING HOUSE: A COURSE OF LECTURES
TO MERCHANTS (Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 1853). “It is as much the law of the ‘true riches’ to
diffuse themselves, as it is of cupidity to hoard. And the more a merchant possesses of this
incorruptible wealth, the more he will be inclined to share it with others. The opportunities for this,
in an extensive business, are equally varied and important.” Id. at 360.
83. See id. at 236 (“[A young man should be i]mpelled to diligence and constancy . . . [and]
steadily advancing towards honour and usefulness, as the other is sinking into disgrace and
contempt.—It cannot be too often reiterated in the ears of our young men, that this is the true path
to success.”)
84. See HUGH ROCKOFF, GREAT FORTUNES OF THE GILDED AGE 3 (2008) (discussing the
origins of the Gilded Age during the late 1800s).
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United States.85 These new industrialists required a new type of lawyer,
one who would be slavishly loyal to their business clients and use whatever
means, no matter how problematic, to achieve their clients’ goals.86 And
the reward for these lawyers was a level of wealth and professional success
that was also unprecedented.87
IV. THE AVARICIOUS LAWYER IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LITERATURE
Most of us, when we think of lawyers in nineteenth century literature,
tend to immediately think of the lawyers of Charles Dickens.88 Dickens’s
lawyers are pompous, often rather stiff members of the English Bar whose
legal machinations delay or prevent justice entirely. 89 But there also
existed American writers in the nineteenth century who wrote about the
American Bar and are far less well known than Dickens. Here, I want to
look at several of those lesser known American writers and their works on
lawyers and the legal profession, for such an examination makes it clear
how much the American public generally distrusted lawyers.
In 1808, George Watterston, a Washington lawyer who went on to
become the first Librarian of Congress, published one of the first
American lawyer novels, The Lawyer, or Man as He Ought Not to Be.90 The
title very much reflects Watterston’s view of lawyers as reflected in his text.
The central character in the book is one Morcel of a Maryland “family
neither illustrious for its antiquity, nor conspicuous for its virtue.”91 He is
an evil character from his birth. He characterizes himself as follows:
I very early began to evince a strong propensity for

85. See id. at 10 (examining robber barons and the Gilded Age’s effect on farm machinery, oil,
meat packing, steel and cigarettes).
86. Cf. Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the
New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239, 264 (2003) (acknowledging the Gilded Age represented a period of
social conflict and the importance of lawyers establishing “neutral and objective” rules to achieve
societal unity).
87. See id. at 256 (recognizing a lawyer’s wealth in the Gilded Age and assuring the justness and
worthiness of the legal profession).
88. See generally John Marshall Gest, The Law and Lawyers of Charles Dickens, 53 AM. L. REG. 401
(1905) (discussing the works and lawyers of Charles Dickens).
89. Cf. id. at 405 (explaining how Dickens’ aim was “ridicule, satirize, and caricature all that he
disliked and despised,” and how he “saw much in the law and lawyers of England to dislike and
despise”).
90. GEORGE WATTERSTON, THE LAWYER, OR, MAN AS HE OUGHT NOT TO BE (Pittsburgh,
Zadok Cramer 1808).
91. Id. at 9.
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Cunning and dissimulation. . . . 92

As a result of this early glimpse of his character, Morcel’s father
determined that he should become a lawyer. The father, according to
Morcel:
labored incessantly to impress upon my mind the inutility of virtue, and the
necessity of deception and hypocrisy, to a man destined as I was for the
profession of the law. It was of no consequence, he said, whether the
conduct of a lawyer were strictly consistent with the principles of integrity or
not, for he would not, on that account, be more generally esteemed or more
eminently conspicuous at the bar. The possession of wealth, he taught me
to regard as the opus magnum of human life, and to obtain it, every faculty,
both of body and mind, should be exerted, and every practice resorted to,
however mean and contemptible, that would, in the smallest degree,
contribute to the accomplishment of that end.93

Throughout the rest of the short novel, Morcel lives up to his early
failings and in his greedy quest for wealth destroys several lives, including
that of a young woman whom he seduces. 94 Watterston’s lawyer’s
character is, of course, a total perversion of what his professional brethren
like Hoffman and Sharswood believed lawyers should be.95 It was the
image of the lawyer portrayed by Watterston that not only helped to fuel
anti-lawyer sentiment but, led men like Hoffman, Sharswood, and Butler
to write their own works to counter this negative image.96
An even more detailed and negative portrait of a lawyer is found in John

92. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 13–14.
94. See id. at 23–24 (admiring a woman named Matilda but owning up to having the
“inhumanity [and] deliberate villainy to destroy [her]”).
95. Compare id. at 58–9 (“The love of wealth . . . [is] the ruling passion. To that I willingly
sacrificed the few virtues I possessed and became . . . the greatest scoundrel at the bar.”), with CAROL
RICE ANDREWS ET AL., GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887
CODE AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 12–13 (2003) (articulating David Hoffman’s
and George Sharswood’s principles of good lawyering as “matters of etiquette, good business
practice . . . social discourse . . . business relations with clients, and proper litigation conduct”).
96. See Ariens, supra note 8, at 572 (“Hoffman has been regularly and favorably cited as a guide
to overcoming ethical woes in the American legal profession.”) The author later tells how
Sharswood taught his students about ethics but advised them to steer away from focusing on virtues
like wealth, because they are only of “factitious importance.” Id. at 606; see also BUTLER, supra
note 44, at 67 (recognizing “literature . . . reflecting the current opinions of each succeeding
generation, is full of instances of course abuse or sharp satire directed against lawyers, by authors,
wits, pamphleteers, and penny-a-liners”).
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Treat Irving’s, The Attorney, or the Correspondence of John Quod, 97 first
published as a series in the magazine, The Knickerbocker,98 and in 1842, as a
book in New York by Robert DeWitt. 99 Irving was a lawyer and the
nephew of the novelist Washington Irving, as well as the son of the lawyer
and judge John T. Irving.100 His portrayal of the main character, John
Quod, shows lawyers at their very worst. The novel is written in the first
person and Quod relates his personal history in a blunt and depressing
way. He began his career by taking “an office in a dark, gloomy building
in the neighborhood of Wall Street” where he “kept like a spider in [his
nest,] on the look-out for the unwary.”101 He was poor and his office was
furnished with only a desk and a few dusty law books.102 As his career
progressed, Quod did whatever he could to earn his living and took any
case he found, regardless of its merits. 103 In a number of cases, his
exertions on behalf of his client not only did not pay dividends for them,
but, in fact, brought about their ruin.104 But this was not enough. The
main plot of the book concerns Quod’s machinations by which he forged
the will of a dead acquaintance, hired thugs to intimidate any witnesses to
the real will, and had former clients, whom he had ruined financially in
earlier cases, put their signatures as witnesses on the forged will.105 All of
this he accomplished to deprive the decedent’s only daughter, a poor,
innocent woman of her legacy, consisting primarily of the only home that
she had ever known. 106 The plot, of course, is a perfect example of
nineteenth century melodrama and the villain is the greedy, grasping lawyer
Quod.107 Happily, for the innocent daughter, Quod’s plot failed and she
97. JOHN T. IRVING, THE ATTORNEY, OR THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN QUOD (Research
Publications, Inc. 1842).
98. John Mark Ockerbloom, The Knickerbocker, ONLINE BOOKS PAGE (last visited Feb. 18,
2017), http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=knickerbockernymm
99. IRVING, supra note 97.
100. CHARLES ELLIOT FITCH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOGRAPHY OF NEW YORK: A LIFE
RECORD OF MEN AND WOMEN OF THE PAST 49 (1916)
101. IRVING, supra note 97, at 12–13.
102. Id. at 13.
103. See id. at 14 (explaining efforts to elbow among the crowds in the courts but concluding
that the profession did not come natural).
104. See generally id. at 19–21 (summarizing a series of sad facts which are recounted throughout
the rest of the book).
105. See id. at 307 (“[H]e had left a Will in favor of his daughter . . . . [T]his Will would be a
mere dead-letter . . . on that ground [because] the present Will [is] forged.”); see also id. at 47–48
(discussing the payment of one thousand dollars to help with a crime of forgery).
106. See id. at 157 (“A few days ago a gentleman in this city died, leaving a large property, and
an only daughter, who would by law have inherited it . . . . Perhaps you understand now . . . I want
[it].”).
107. See generally id.
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eventually received her rightful estate.108
Irving’s book, with its negative portrayal of a lawyer achieved a large
audience. The Knickerbocker was one of the most popular magazines of its
period with a large readership. The book form of Irving’s tale was highly
touted by the editors of The Knickerbocker:
[I]t was entitled to the appellation “thrilling.” . . . Dickens himself does not
better understand, than does the author of ‘The Quod Correspondence,’ the
art of stimulating without satisfying curiosity, until the whole of his story is
before his readers. The wiles of his ‘head-devil, the “infernal Attorney’
and the retribution at last visited upon him, are in the way of graphic
description, and stirring incident, wholly unsurpassed by any kindred work
with which we are acquainted.109

Of course, while the fame of The Attorney may have benefited Irving’s
finances and career as a novelist, it did little good for the reputation of the
legal profession.
One might ask a question at this point: Why did two successful lawyers,
Watterston and Irving, write novels that portrayed lawyers as avaricious,
unprincipled predators upon the public? I can suggest one possible
answer. Both Watterston and Irving were members of the legal elite.110
Both came from prosperous families and both had successful careers.111
The villains in both novels, while lawyers, however, were not lawyers like
them. These were not successful members of the legal elite. Instead, both
Morcel and Quod came from poor backgrounds and their practices would
undoubtedly have qualified them in the eyes of men like Watterston and
Irving as worthy of the title “pettifogger.”112 Whether the general public
who read these novels were able to make such a distinction, however, is
108. See id. at 368 (explaining how the daughter received the good news of getting her valid
will).
109. John A. Gray, Announcement for 1860, 54 Knickerbocker Magazine 428, 430 (October,
1859)
OF
CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/about/about-the110. See
e.g.,
LIBRARY
librarian/previous-librarians-of-congress/george-watterston/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (listing a
laundry list of accomplishments by George Watterston, including serving as the third librarian of
congress); see also FITCH, supra note 100, at 49 (stating John Irving was the son of a judge and born in
a family mansion on Wall Street in New York City).
111. See FITCH, supra note 100, at 49 (highlighting some of John Irving’s accomplishments, as
well as his family’s, including Irving graduating from Columbia College and earning distinction of
republication for his published work in England); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 110
(showcasing several feats accomplished throughout Watterston’s career).
112. A pettifogger is a “sneaky, underhanded” lawyer. VOCABULARY.COM, Dictionary,
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/pettifogger (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).

178

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 7:160

unclear.
The final nineteenth century legal work that I want to discuss is not a
novel, but rather a series of essays. The authors, Henry and Charles
Francis Adams, descendants of two American Presidents and distinguished
writers and diplomats, wrote several essays on the stock manipulations
used by a group of infamous stock “operators,” Jim Fisk, Cornelius
Vanderbilt, Daniel Drew, and Jim Gould, to take over several American
railroad lines after the Civil War.113 These essays were first published in
major magazines of the era and then, in 1871, gathered into a book,
Chapters of Erie and Other Essays, 114 published in Boston by James R.
Osgood.115 In addition to these essays, a number of other essays as well
as correspondence about the affair were published both in magazines and
newspapers.116
The battles for the takeover of the Erie Railroad and other railroads
were the first major corporate stock battle in United States history.117 It
was a battle fought in the market and in the courts.118 In addition to the
aforementioned main players, it involved President Grant’s family, the
New York City political machine, a number of judges associated with that
machine—including the father of Benjamin Cardozo—as well as some of
the most prominent lawyers in the United States, including David Dudley
Field.119 In scope and importance, the Erie scandal approached our own
Enron scandal. In carrying out their battle for acquisition of the stock
they sought, Fisk and Gould and their confederates engaged in stock
fraud, extortion and serious abuse of the judicial process.120 At the center
113. See CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER ESSAYS
5, 27 (Bedford, Mass., James R. Osgood & Co. 1871) (discussing a “series of events in the Erie
history” involving Daniel Drew and Cornelius Vanderbilt, and later introducing Jim Fisk and Jim
Gould).
114. CHARLES F. ADAMS JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER ESSAYS
(Bedford, Mass., James R. Osgood & Co. 1871).
115. Id.
116. See e.g., CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR. ET AL., HIGH FINANCE IN THE SIXTIES,
CHAPTERS FROM THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ERIE RAILWAY (1929).
117. See PATRICK A. GAUGAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 41 (5th ed. 2011) (stating the first great takeover battle began in 1868, which
involved “an attempt to take control” of the Erie Railroad and “large quantities of stock”).
118. See id. (explaining how a defense to the takeover attempt was to self-issue stock and
recognizing legal remedies were weak due to bribery).
119. See e.g., ADAMS, JR. & ADAMS, supra note 113, at 124–25 (discussing a letter addressed to
President Grant); see also id. at 86–87 (highlighting some of Judge Albert Cardozo’s roles in the
lawsuits); id. at 36–37 (listing a question and answer conversation concerning David Dudley Field).
120. Cf. id. at 84 (describing the story as “ridiculous” and illustrative of how “utterly
demoralized the public mind ha[s] become, and how prepared for any act of high-fraud or outrage
[the public should be]”).
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of all of this were the lawyers. In this scandal, the modern conception of
the “corporate lawyer” was born and the traditional ethical values of the
American Bar were put to the ultimate challenge.
David Dudley Field was one of the most eminent members of the
American and New York City Bars at the time of the Erie scandal.121 His
brother, Stephen Field, was a noted jurist who became a justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court.122 His father was a noted clergyman.123 He was
one of the leading proponents of procedural reform in the United States
and principal author of the New York Code of Procedure that was named
after him, the Field Code.124 He was a leading member of the legal elite.
Thus, his deep involvement in the machinations of the Erie operators was
itself a source of great controversy.125
In a series of letters between Field and Samuel Bowles, a Springfield,
Massachusetts newspaper editor, the two men debated whether Field had,
in fact, acted unethically and dishonorably.126 Field maintained that he
had done nothing either legally or morally offensive. Bowles, on the other
hand, condemned Field for representing the Erie operators when he knew
what they were doing was fraudulent and, in some cases, illegal.127 Other
essays were published both attacking Field and supporting him.128 The
essence of Field’s argument was that he had not violated any established
rules nor had he known of, or participated in, any illegal acts in his
representation of his clients.129 His critics argued that he should not have
represented such “bad” characters in the first place and that once he had
taken on the representation he should have exercised independence of
121. See Irving Browne, David Dudley Field, 3 GREEN BAG 49, 50 (1981) (noting Field’s
reputation during the Erie Litigation, including how he “availed himself, for the benefit of his
clients . . . with unshrinking boldness”).
122. Id. at 49.
123. See id. (“The father of this eminent [family] was the Rev. David Dudley Field, of Haddam,
Conn., and Stockbridge, Mass.,—a clergyman of acknowledged learning, piety and strength of
character.”).
124. See ADAMS, JR. & ADAMS, supra note 113, at 109 (“Mr. Field . . . was an eminent law
reformer [and] author of the New York Code . . . .”).
125. See Browne, supra note 121, at 50 (explaining how Field “made many enemies among
lawyers, and encountered bitter blame from the public” because of the Erie Litigation).
126. ADAMS, JR. & ADAMS, supra note 113, at 92–93.
127. Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley
Field and Samuel Bowles, AM. J. LEGAL HIST., July 1977, at 191, 199.
128. See, e.g., ADAMS, JR. & ADAMS, supra note 113, at 3 (describing the implications of the Erie
wars and how “[the Erie wars] touch very nearly the foundation of common truth and honesty
without which that healthy public opinion cannot exist which is the life’s breath of our whole
political system”).
129. See Schudson, supra note 127, at 199 (discussing the correspondence between Field and
Bowles where Field defends his professionalism).
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action and refused to do what was asked of him when to do so was
dishonorable.130
To some degree, the debate between Field’s supporters and critics was a
debate over Lord Brougham’s famous statement that a lawyer must do
everything possible to represent his client regardless of the consequences
to the public or to himself—a debate that had been going on among
lawyers for half a century. 131 Interestingly, Field explicitly rejected
Brougham’s theory and simply defended his actions by saying that they
were neither dishonorable nor illegal.132 But beneath the rhetoric of the
debates over Field’s actions was something more fundamental. In essence,
what so upset Field’s critics was that one of the leading lawyers of the day
was using his considerable legal talents to assist his clients in activities that
were harmful to the public. 133 The message that Field’s critics were
conveying was that Field, in pursuit of the vast fortune in fees that his
clients were paying, was willing to compromise his civic responsibilities
and his conscience.134
In my opinion, the Erie scandal and Field’s role in it marked a turning
point in American legal ethics. Field was, as I suggested, the first true
corporate lawyer in American history.135 His work for the Erie operators
130. See id. at 196–197 (claiming a lawyer is not bound to choose every case).
131. See Hoeflich, Other Tradition, supra note 11, at 793 (describing the debate over zealous
client representation by lawyers). “Just as the adversarial system and the concept of overwhelming
loyalty to, and advocacy for, a client in that system has its proponents, so, too, does it have its
detractors.” Id.
132. See id. at 815 (describing Field’s claim of the moral high ground in his representation of
Erie). “What was important to Field was that, in his opinion, he was bound to represent his clients
regardless of their actions or character and, furthermore, that he was bound to use all means
possible—within the law—to further his clients’ cause as part of his representation.” Id.
133. See Schudson, supra note 127, at 196–97 (discussing the distaste of high powered lawyers
by the press). “For a lawyer, the Times wrote in an editorial, Fisk should have turned to the ‘Tombs
bar’ but instead went to ‘a leading jurist and law-reformer of the State, a man of wide reputation and
large fortune, and, instead of being shown the door, found no difficulty in employing him in his
worst cases.’” Id.
134. See id. at 196–197 (asserting the lawyer’s primary value is money). “Everything is taken as
a matter of course. A lawyer, therefore, thinks first of making money; and as there is a fortune in the
law business of the Erie Road . . . .” Id. But see Browne, supra note 121, at 55 (“Mr. Field has in a
sense lived to an age which ‘knows not Joseph.’ But legal history will do justice to his potent, useful,
and noble career.”).
135. See Maxwell Bloomfield, Lawyers and Public Criticism: Challenge and Response in NineteenthCentury America, AM. J. LEGAL HIST., Oct. 1971, at 269, 814 [hereinafter Bloomfield, Lawyers and
Public Criticism] (“The context was the rise of a new type of law in the United States, what we now call
corporate law, and the lawyer most responsible for popularizing the view was David Dudley Field.”);
see also Schudson, supra note 127, at 208 (describing Field as a corporate lawyer); Hoeflich, Other
Tradition, supra note 11, at 816 (“The idea of the lawyer as moral arbiter of his client’s case and the
notion that a lawyer should act within severely defined limits in his representation of clients gave way

2017] Ethics and the “Root of All Evil” in Nineteenth Century American Law Practice

181

occupied virtually all of his time.136 They were his principal client to the
exclusion of all others. 137 Also, this client was willing to pay massive
amounts of money to their lawyer to achieve their goals.138 This was a far
cry from the traditional model of law practice in the United States where
no one client could monopolize a lawyer’s time nor pay so much in fees as
to make the lawyer fabulously wealthy. 139 In effect, Field became a
captive of his clients and his reward was great wealth. He sacrificed his
independence, and—in the eyes of his critics—his honor in the pursuit of
money.
In fact, the dangers great railroad corporations posed to the
independence of lawyers may well have been one of the principal
motivations for the drafting of the first formal code of legal ethics adopted
by an American jurisdiction. In 1887, Alabama adopted a code of legal
ethics.140 The primary author of this code was Thomas Goode Jones.141
Jones was a wealthy farmer and lawyer in Alabama who served in the
Confederate army during the Civil War; and afterwards became a
prominent Alabama lawyer and politician.142 He was also retained by a
number of railroad corporations; and it was this work that made him
realize that when a lawyer served such corporations he inevitably faced the
temptation to give up his independence of professional judgment and
become a servant of his client to reap the monetary rewards such service
would provide.143 He was so concerned about this temptation that he
championed the adoption of a formal ethics code by the state, one that
to the demands of corporate and individual clients who wanted zealous advocacy not moral criticism
from their attorneys.”).
136. Cf. Browne, supra note 121, at 52 (“Mr. Field had able associates and assistants in this
work, but he himself wrought and produced more upon it than all of them together . . . .”).
137. See id. at 50 (“[Field] simply availed himself, for the benefit of his clients [in the ‘Erie
Litigations’], of the existing remedies, with unshrinking boldness, and not to a greater extent than had
been before and has since been done in some important instances.”).
138. See Schudson, supra note 127, at 195 (“Field and the forty other lawyers who assisted him
received $333,416 for their efforts, Field’s own four-man firm taking in $48,289.”).
139. See Hoeflich, Other Tradition, supra note 11, at 817 (explaining moral objectives were placed
higher than financial goals in the nineteenth century).
140. ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS (ALA. BAR ASS’N 1887).
141. See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 95, at 2 (“[Jones] was the natural choice to author the
Association’s code, and at the fourth annual meeting of the Bar in 1882 he was nominated as
chairman of a three-member committee to draft the code.”).
142. See id. at 65 (“Students of history are more likely to know Jones as a Confederate veteran
and New South Lawyer who achieved high office as Alabama’s governor (1890-1894) and as a federal
judge (1901-1914).”).
143. See id. at 77–80 (explaining Jones’ impasse with the railroad corporations). “Railroads in
particular were jealous mistresses, as Jones found in the late 1870s, when he paid a price for
separating his professional and political personae.” Id.
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would make surrendering to such temptation more difficult.144 As many
know, the Alabama Code of 1887 became the model for the first American
Bar Association Code of 1908.145
From a jurisprudential perspective, I think it is fair to posit that when a
profession finds it necessary to adopt formal rules that carry sanctions for
breaches, this signals the breakdown of informal professional ethics. In
the antebellum United States, there was a consensus among the elite of the
American Bar about how lawyers should behave, the dangers of avarice in
practice, and the loss of professional judgment and independence when
the acquisition of wealth becomes the primary purpose for being a
lawyer.146 In the thoughts of the elite, such actions converted the lawyer
from a professional into a tradesman. 147 During this period, the elite
became the custodians of the profession’s honor, and advocated for a level
of professional ethics they believed necessary to maintain the prestige of
the Bar.148 Unethical behavior, greed, and dishonesty were, in the elite’s
minds, characteristics of pettifoggers, the “bottom feeders” of the Bar.149
After the Civil War, the rise of great corporations, railroads, steel
companies, and oil trusts created a new type of client who could offer the
elite members of the profession monetary temptations they had hitherto
not experienced. 150 David Dudley Field’s representation of the Erie
144. See id. at 1 (describing Jones’ motivation for developing a formal ethics code because he
“perceived a strong need for a guide that would establish a standard of honor and integrity for the
Alabama Bar”).
145. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N. 1908).
146. See Bloomfield, Lawyers and Public Criticism, supra note 135, at 270 (“[P]ractitioners in
Jacksonian America . . . were more apt than their predecessors to cherish a narrow vocational
outlook toward their work and to insist upon a technical competence that set them apart from their
fellow men, as it enabled them to justify their elite status in American society . . . .”).
147. See id. (providing there was a thought that antebellum era practitioners who considered
themselves elite were more likely than their predecessors to “cherish a narrow vocational outlook
toward their work and to insist upon a technical competence that set them apart from their fellow
men” since it more firmly planted their elite status).
148. See id. at 269 (describing the elite leadership in reforming the morality of the bar, and
stating: “Finally, after several decades of disorder and demoralization, an elite leadership arises to
purge the profession of its populist standards of recruitment and achievement, through the creation
of the first modern bar associations in the eighteen-seventies”).
149. For an example of the type of behavior considered to be that of a pettifogger see the case
of George W. Niven. WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CASE OF GEORGE W. NIVEN 92 (New York, Van
Pelt & Spear 1822) (addressing the disbarment of George Niven, and proclaiming “the honour of a
liberal profession is tarnished, when its members stoop to the shifts, and the expedients we have
been considering, as the means of procuring a recompense for professional employment”).
150. See Hoeflich, Other Tradition, supra note 11, at 815 (detailing the new type of clients for the
elite bar members). It states:
Not surprisingly, given the large amounts of money at stake, these robber barons were easily
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operators and the consequent scandal to which it gave birth, forced the
American Bar to recognize that even the elite were at risk of succumbing
to avarice.151 Thus, men like Thomas Goode Jones recognized that, for
the first time, formal codes of ethics applying to all members of the Bar
were necessary to protect the honor of the profession and to fight the root
of all evil.152

able to find legal talent to serve their purposes. What is significant, however, is that many of the
lawyers who served men like Gould and Fisk were not the dregs of the profession, or the backroom pettifoggers despised by men like Sharswood or Hoffman. Instead, they were often
individuals of the highest professional standing.
Id.
151. See id. (“Field’s dissertations on the lawyer-client relationship and the ethical obligations
of lawyers within it is, to a large extent, the harbinger of the modern idea of zealous advocacy.”).
152. See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 95, at 91–2 (“With such a guide, pointing out in advance
the sentiment of the Bar against practices which it condemns, we would find them gradually
disappearing; and should any be bold enough to engage in evil practices, the Code would be ready
witness for his condemnation, and carry with it the whole moral power of the profession.”).

